We test whether output growth in European economic agglomeration regions depends on nancial development. To this end we suggest a relative measure of the quality of nancial institutions rather than the usual quantity proxy of nancial development. In order to measure the quality of nancial development we use prot eciency derived from stochastic frontier analysis. We show that more ecient banks spur regional growth while the typically used quantity measure of nancial development is negligible. Also, our results suggest an additional channel through which better banking can spur growth: the interaction of more credit with ecient banks.
Non-technical summary
The creation of an ecient nancial system is an explicit objective of the European Commission. Ongoing harmonization of regulation to foster an increasingly homogenous European banking system ultimately serves the purpose to enhance competition and thereby economic prosperity.
At the same time, regional dierences continue to persist across European banking markets. Therefore, we investigate in this study whether regional bank eciency has a positive impact on regional growth. We employ bank-specic data to estimate prot eciency with stochastic frontier analysis for approximately 3,000 banks active in 160 European regions between 1997 and 2003.
Our study thus analyzes if a micro-economic measure of banks' abilities to convert savings and deposits eciently into loans suited to fund investments is positively aecting regional economic growth.
Our results conrm that higher mean prot eciency fosters regional output growth. In particular, in Europe's fairly mature economic regions this quality channel for growth appears to be of larger importance compared to the traditionally employed quantity channel . In contrast to regional bank prot eciency, neither the eect of credit volume relative to gross domestic product nor the interaction between quality and quantity are individually statistically dierent from zero.
The existence and economic signicance of this quality channel of banking on growth is corroborated by our nding that it exhibits the largest positive magnitude when jointly specied with the quantity and interaction eects of nancial development. Notably, in this parsimonious model all three measures aect growth signicantly positive. However, the eect of improving regional prot eciency is approximately three times as large as the respective two alternatives. We conclude that future studies on the nance-growth nexus should try to accommodate explicitly these three distinct mechanisms through which nance may foster growth. The quality of banking and regional growth 1 1 Introduction A better provision of nancial services should reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and thus ease the accumulation of capital by a better selection of benecial investment projects, improved monitoring of lenders and a mere reduction of resources wasted in the intermediation process by banks (Greenwood and Smith, 1996; Pagano, 1993) .
Many studies analyze this nance-growth nexus empirically by explaining cross-country growth dierentials by the volume of nancial funds intermediated relative to economic output (King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000) .
However, a mere expansion of the quantity of credit need not indicate a qualitative improvement of intermediaries' abilities to channeling scarce nancial funds from savers to borrowers. We suggest a more direct measure of the quality of nance rather than it's quantity trying to address the issue of poor empirical proxies for theoretical counterparts raised by Levine (2004) .
We test if bank eciency, estimated at the rm-level, signicantly spurs growth. This relative measure of bank performance gauges the quality of nancial institutions relative to its peers instead of the quantity of nancial funds intermediated. While a number of recent studies highlight the importance of local dierences in the provision of nancial services and the relation between nancial market structure and economic growth, we are aware of only one study attempting to empirically measure the intermediation quality of banks 1 more explicitly. Lucchetti et al. (2001) conrm that regional growth in Italian provinces depends positively on mean cost eciency of banks serving local communities. Other regional studies continue to highlight the importance to account for regional dierences, but usually focus on other proxies of quality.
For example, Guiso et al. (2004) use household survey data to demonstrate that the probability to obtain credit diers across Italian regions. Their results show that easier access to credit is conducive to higher regional growth rates and a larger number of new rm establishments, further underpinning the importance to account for regional nancial development.
But these ndings for Italy are contrasted to some extent by other studies, for example for the U.S. by Clarke (2004) . She reports that the interstate branching act led to an expansion of credit provided, which is correlated with state growth. However, she also points out carefully that whether larger banking markets are a determinant or a consequence of economic growth remains a conundrum. Valverde et al. (2003) add to the ambiguity with a study on ve Spanish provinces. They report that ve dierent measures of competition are mostly related to narrowed interest margins. But Granger causality tests fail to support the hypothesis of ensuing growth spurts due to higher competition.
They conclude that some of the evidence in the cross-country nance growth literature between more sophisticated measures of nancial development and growth could thus be explained by unspecied third factors.
Our paper contributes on the few regional studies on nancial development in two respects. First, we present evidence for the positive relation between banking quality and economic growth in European regions of 23 member countries of the European Union. Thus, we maintain the apparently important regional focus while covering a more comprehensive sample of an increasingly integrating nancial system. To this end we employ bank-level data obtained from the Bankscope database, which we allocate each bank to a specic European region. Second, we hypothesize that a potential candidate for the un-observed third factor is the economic eciency of banks to convert scarce resources into nancial products and services. More specically, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) point out that cost eciency alone may fail to capture a bank's ability to convert inputs eciently into outputs since the measure focuses only on the cost aspects of banking businesses. Instead, they suggest to also assess bank's skills to maximize prots for a given production plan by estimating prot eciency. Our study is to our best knowledge therefore the rst to analyze the relation between regional growth in Europe and banks' abilities to generate prots eciently.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce our empirical approach to test whether higher regional prot eciency fosters economic growth. Section 3 provides information on our approach to allocate banks to European regions and on the data used in this study. We discuss our results in section 4, before we conclude in section 6.
2 Methodology 2.1 Regional growth Mora et al. (2005) identify regional growth poles as opposed to periphery regions in Europe, which exhibit signicantly dierent growth patterns, respectively. Likewise, despite the ongoing harmonization of nancial industries across European countries, the eciency of banks to intermediate nancial funds remains not only heterogeneous across national banking markets but also at the regional level within countries (Bos and Kool, 2006) .
Given the importance of regional dierences, we hypothesize that higher regional bank eciency should promote regional growth, too. We specify a reduced form growth model as a dynamic panel model :
(1)
Variables in lower cases are denoted in logarithms, t are time indicators and r indexes European regions at the NUTS (Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques) 2 level according to the taxonomy of Eurostat. 2 To eliminate µ r , an unobserved region-specic eect, we use the GMM dierence estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and employ lagged levels as instruments for ∆y r,t−1 .
We specify a vector of further control variables, x, the growth rate of the working population P OP . 3 Financial development is measured in two ways:
the volume F V and the quality of nancial development F Q. The former resembles the well-known specication of bank credit volume relative to GDP in the nance-growth literature.
Banking quality
The latter represents our approach to assess the quality of nancial intermediation more directly. We measure a bank's relative eciency to convert inputs into a production set while maximizing prots. Such a relative measure is conceptually less prone to reverse causality criticism. A higher ability of banks to demand inputs at given prices in optimal volumes and proportions should inuence growth positively independent of whether the economy is expanding or contracting.
Secondly, a region that hosts banks that full their project selection and loan monitoring functions on average more ecient relative to other regions, should benet in terms of growth since the "right" projects receive funding at the "right" cost of lending given risk.
We assume that banks demand labor and borrowed funds at given factor 2 Descriptive statistics of all data used are provided in section 3. 3 Appropriate proxies of human capital were not available at the regional level.
4 prices w to produce customer loans y 1 and other earning assets y 2 subject to a technology constraint, which also depends on equity z, and a pricing opportunity set such that prots before tax P BT are maximized (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) . Note that in the alternative prot model, we assume that regional banks possess some pricing discretion on the output side subject to a pricing opportunity set H(p, y, w, z), where p denotes output prices. H(•)
is another constraint next to T (•). As noted by Altunbas et al. (2001) this model does not only allow for the reasonable assumption that banks may have some degrees of freedom in their local market, but also to circumvent well-known measurement problems with banks' output prices (Mountain and Thomas, 1999) . Then, maximum prots π * (O, P, Z) depend on given input prices, available equity and output quantities and we write a translog stochastic prot frontier as:
In addition to bank production data dened above, we also specify country dummies in z as well as a time trend t to account for technical change. Thus, we account for unobserved heterogeneity across European banks by controls and the bank-specic xed eect α i . A bank i can deviate from optimal prots before tax P BT due to random noise v it or ineciency u it .
We use a recently suggested panel frontier estimator by Greene (2005) , which allows for time-variant ineciency which does not impose any monotonous trend of eciency over time as most other estimators do. Upon estimation of equation (2), we impose homogeneity and symmetry restrictions and dene the total error as ε
. Ineciency is iid with u it ∼ N |(0, σ 2 u )| and independent of the v it . Point estimates of eciency are obtained as the conditional expectation of u given ε (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) . Hence, a value for prot eciency P E of 80% implies that the bank could have generated 20% more of observed prots with the given production plan, had it been employing in-and outputs eciently 3 Data and regional allocation
We use data on nancial accounts for approximately 7000 banks active in the EU-25 between 1997 and 2003 available from Bankscope. These banks are mapped to 254 NUTS 2 regions on the basis of three regional identiers included in the Bankscope database. 4 In addition to the country and the city, a zip code is provided for most banks. The availability of these regional identiers eased the mapping considerably.
We proceeded to map banks to NUTS 2 regions starting with Germany, which represents the country with the largest national group of banks in the sample. The mapping of German banks is facilitated by the fact that German districts Regierungsbezirke correspond to NUTS 2 regions. Given that we have the postcodes of banks and matching Regierungsbezirke, the majority of German banks is easily allocated to NUTS 2 regions. 5
In a similar vein, we allocate French banks to their respective NUTS region with the help of their the postcode. The NUTS 2 regions in France correspond to the 26 departements, which include several postcodes. We use the information on banks' postcodes to map banks to their NUTS 2 regions. The rst two digits of the French postcode identify the NUTS 2 region. Also Italian 4 Note there are 50 banks for which neither city nor postcode is available 5 In order to map postcodes to Regierungsbezirke we relied on the so-called Regionalschlüssel which enciphers German regions via a 12 digit code. The largest territorial unit, the Federal State (Bundesland), is enciphered by the rst two digits while the smallest unit, municipality (Gemeinde), is given by the 10th to 12th digit. Regierungsbezirke are given by the third digit. Particular care has to be taken for one case where the Reginalschlüssel indicates only one Regierungsbezirk when there are in fact two namely Brandenburg-Nordost (NUTS 2 code DE41) and Brandenburg-Südwest (NUTS code DE42).
banks are allocated to NUTS codes via their postcodes. Here, a range of postcodes corresponds to a NUTS code. The allocation of the Spanish banks was facilitated by the fact that the NUTS 2 regions coincide with the 17 Spanish autonomic regions, which are divided in 50 provinces. Given that postcodes in Spain correspond with the provinces we allocate the Spanish banks with their Nuts 2 regions. The rst two letters of the postcode identify the province and consequently the NUTS region. NUTS 2 regions in Austria are conform with the Austrian Bundesländer. The Austrian system of postcodes is linked with the 9 Bundesländer. Hence, the allocation of the Austrian banks could be realized by connecting the postcodes with the NUTS 2 regions.
All banks that could not be mapped via their post code are mapped manually. In this second step we used the information on the city to allocate banks to NUTS 2 regions. This procedure reduces the number of units that have to be allocated signicantly. In addition we use the postcode to double-check. 6 Eight countries comprise only one NUTS 2 region. In these cases the allocation of banks to NUTS 2 regions is straightforward given the country location of banks. These countries are Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia.
We aggregate point estimates of prot eciency to serve as our proxy for the regional quality of nancial intermediaries F Q. Our data from Eurostat is an unbalanced panel of the 254 dierent NUTS 2 regions in the EU-25. 7 We regress real gross domestic product per worker on the growth of the working population and our proxies for nancial development. After the exclusion of outliers, our sample includes unconsolidated nancial accounts data for 23,310 universal bank-year observations between 1996 and 2003. We depict descriptive statistics on these data in table 1. 6 Oversea and Oshore territories were omitted form the data set. 7 Regions in Poland and Slovenia were dropped from the sample given implausible observations on bank data which are probably due to data errors. Hence our sample comprises 23 countries and 237 NUTS 2 regions. 7 
Results
We depict parameters estimates for the regional growth model in equation (1) in table 2. Since especially the volume of nancial funds may not be independent of economic growth, we specify both measures of nancial development as endogenous variables and use lagged levels as instruments. This approach is supported by the Sargan specication tests.
Consider rst the direct eect of regional bank eciency in the rst column of table 2. The eect of a one percent increase in regional bank prot eciency spurs regional output growth by approximately 0.03%. Put dierently, a higher ability of banks in the region to convert inputs prot eciently into nancial services and products has a positive inuence on regional economic growth. Since regional mean P E is fairly low at 36%, the magnitude of the coecient implies that already an improvement of banks operating efciency by around one standard deviation (about 6%) would translate into 0.4 percentage points of additional economic growth. Since these economically meaningful gains could theoretically be simply accomplished by a slightly less wasteful way of banking, this result is an important indication to further foster the prot eciency of banking in Europe.
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In the second column of table 2, we next test the eect of the traditionally specied quantity variable, F V , on regional European growth. While positive, our results do not conrm a signicant direct eect of larger credit volumes relative to GDP. Apparently, a mere expansion of credit volume alone does not promote growth in Europe's generally fairly mature economies. As previously, and in line with expectations, the coecients on the lagged endogenous variable and growth of the working population are positive but smaller one and negative, respectively.
While both the quantity and the quality of the provision of nancial services may have individual eects on growth, it is intuitive to also expect both eects to interact with each other. Providing more credit with low eciency may imply a poor selection of projects. High eciency alone, in turn, may indicate that banks scrutinize excessively their supply of loans and avoid, for example, lending to more opaque small businesses which might bear future loan write o's given a dicult and costly assessment.
Therefore, we also test if the interaction between the quality of intermediaries and the volume of intermediated funds has a signicant eect on growth.
The individual eect in the third column inuences regional growth in Europe signicantly but with a wrong sign. The negative sign, however, disappears when a parsimonious model depicted in the nal column is specied. The result demonstrates that future studies on the nance-growth nexus need to account for three channels through which better banking can spur growth: a direct quality and quantity eect, respectively, as well as the benecial interaction of more regional credit in conjunction with ecient regional banks.
Regarding the magnitude of these coecients, we nd that it is in particular more ecient banking that oers most scope to foster regional economic growth. A one percent increase in the prot eciency of banks has approximately three times the eect on growth compared to either the same relative increase in lending volume or the interaction between both channels. We con-clude that the quality of nancial institutions in a region has a positive impact on growth independent of the quantity channel. Also after including the volume and the interaction eect, respectively, we still nd a positive coecient of bank eciency.
The specications in table 2 are further conrmed by the coecient of our control variable for the growth of the working population POP. In line with theory, the coecient is negative and signicant across all specications implying that an increase in the working population leads to a lower per capita income (Solow, 1956) .
Robustness
To check the robustness of our results we run additional estimations focusing on a subset of the regions in our data set. To begin with we use the regions in the EU 12, 15 and 19. The sample of regions in the EU 12 and 15 represent the nancially more developed regions in the EU while the EU 19 also includes regions from the new accession countries. Columns 2 to 4 in Table 3 contain the results.
The results largely underpin the previously shown result, namely, nancial development and particularly the quality of nancial intermediation matters for economic growth. The results in column (1) further highlight that in more mature economies nancial development predominantly works via the interplay of quality and quantity. We also exclude a number of regions which present nancial centers and may thus bias our results. 8 However, as column (5) shows the exclusion of nancial centers only marginally aects our results. Our measure for the quality of nancial development and the interaction term retain their positive and signicant coecient while the quantity measure turns in-signicant. Finally, we include a concentration ratio measured by the market share of the ve largest banks within a region to check our results for a possible misspecication due to omitted variables. The result in column (6) shows that a higher concentration is positively and signicantly related to growth and conrms the arguments in the literature (Cetorelli, 2001) . However, the inclusion only marginally aects our previously identied channels through which nancial development aects economic growth. We suggest a measure to assess the impact of the quality of nancial intermediaries on economic growth rather than the traditionally employed quantity proxies of nancial fund volumes. To this end we measure European bank's prot eciency and allocate both nancial quality and quantity indicators to the NUTS 2 region of the bank. Our results show that economic growth in the regions of the EU benets signicantly from higher regional prot eciency.
Our results after including also the quantity channel of nancial development and the interaction between both better and more banking corroborate the presence of an independent eect of prot eciency on European economic growth. In fact, the ndings highlight the importance to specify all three possible channels through which banks may foster output growth. According to our estimates improvements in eciency have approximately three times the eect compared to both the quantity and interaction channel. Thus, we conclude that it is especially the quality of nancial services provision in the vein of Schumpeter that spurs economic prosperity in Europe's relative mature economic regions.
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